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HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS IN 
GERMANY?-THEEUROPEAN 
ATTEMPT TO HARMONIZE THE 
T AKEOVER LAW AND ITS IMP ACT 
ON GERMAN COMPANY LAW* 
ROLAND DONATH--
I. INTRODUCTION 
A lot of trees have died for the advancement of the law of 
corporate mergers and acquisitions, not only in America\ but 
* Edited by Antointette L. Nichols. 
** M.C.J. 1990 (U.T.Austin); S.J.D. (Dr. iur.) 1989 (Augsburg); J.D. 1985 (Augsburg); 
currently Visiting Scholar at U.T. Austin. 
1. A data base check shows several hundred Law Review publications dealing with 
legal problems of mergers and acquisitions, a great many of them discussing hostile take-
overs. This reflects perfectly well the reality of Corporate America during the eightiees: 
while in 1978 about 1450 mergers and acquisitions took place, their number increased 
steadily to 3500 in 1988. No less impressive is the amount of money involved: from about 
35 Billions $ in total in 1979 the value of all transactions increased rapidly over the years 
to reach the incredible figure of 230 Billions $ in 1988 (Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
53 (1989). The most recent publications in the US dealing with the subject of this article 
are Jeffrey P. Greenbaum, Tender Offers in the European Community: The playing 
field shrinks, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 923 (1989); John C. Anjier, Anti Takeover Stat-
utes, Shareholders, Stakeholders and Risk, 51 LA L. REV. 561 (1991); Philip N. 
Hablutzel/David R. Selmer, Hostile Corporate Takeovers: History and Overview, 8 
NORTHERN ILL. L. REV. 203 (1988); Ronald J. Gilson, The political Ecology of Takeovers: 
Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 161 (1992); Clark D. Stith, Federalism and Company Law: A "Race to the 
Bottom" in the European Community, 79 GEO. L.J. 1581 (1991); Edward F. Greene, Reg-
ulatory and Legislative Responses to Takeover Activity in the 1980s: The United States 
and Europe, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1539 (1991); Yedida Z. Stern, Acquisition of corporate con-
trol by numerous privately negotiated transactions: A proposal for the resolution of 
street .~weeps, 58 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1195 (1993); Eric Grannis, A problem of mixed mo-
tives, Applying Unocal to defensive Esops, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 851 (1992); Paul E. Burns, 
Timing is Paramount: The impact of Paramount v. Time on the law of hostile take-
91 
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also in Germany,2 Italy,3 France4 the United KingdomG and 
overs, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 761 (1992); Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate 
Charters and the lesson of takeover statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 84 (1993); Jill E. 
Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 87 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 523 (1993); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting state takeover laws at 
proxy contests, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1071 (1992); Randall S. Thomas and Robert G. Han-
sen, A theoretic analysis of corporate auctioneers' liability regimes, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 
1147 (1992); Steven D. Gardner, A step forward: Exclusivity of the statutory Appraisal 
Remedy for minority shareholders dissenting from going-private merger transactions, 
53 OHIO·ST. L. J. 239 (1992); Josef A. Grundfest, Just vote no: A minimalist strategy for 
dealing with barbarians inside the gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993); Randall S. 
Thomas, Judicial Review of defensive tactics in proxy contests: When is using a rights 
plan right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503 (1993); Raymond J. Blackwood, Applying Fraudulent 
Conveyance law to leveraged buyouts, 42 DUKE L.J. 340 (1992). 
2. Michael Adams, Was spricht gegen eine ungehinderte Ubertragbarkeit der in 
den Unternehmen gebundenen Ressourcen durch ihre Eigentilmer?, DIE AKTIENGESELL-
SCHAFT 243 (1990); Carsten Thomas Ebenroth/A. Rapp, Abwehr von Unternehmens-
abernahmen, DWIR 2 (1991); Heinz-Dieter Assmann et al., Ubernahmeangebote, ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (SPECIAL ISSUE 9) (1990); Ingrid 
Depser, Der Vorschlag der EG-Kommission zur Takeover-Richtlinie im Spiegel der 
amerikanischen Takeover-Erfahrung, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 351 
(1992); Bernd F. v. Falkenhausen, Das "Takeover-Game" - Unternehmenskiiufe in den 
USA, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERNST STIEFEL 163 (1987); Barbara Grunewald, Was bringt der 
Vorschlag einer 13. EG-Richtlinie aber Ubernahmeangebote filr das deutsche Recht?, 
WM 1233 (1989); id., Der geanderte Vorschlag einer 13. EG- Richtlinie betreffend 
Ubernahmeangebote, WM 1361 (1991); K. H. Jander and R.T. McDermott, Neue 
Methoden bei Unternehmenskaufen in den USA, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRT-
SCHAFT 957 (1990); Edgar Joussen, Die Treuepflicht des Aktionars bei feindlichen 
Ubernahmen, BETRIEBs-BERATER 1075 (1992); HEINz-CHRIsTIAN KNOLL, DIE UBERNAHME 
VON KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN UNTER BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DES SCHUTZES VON 
MINDERHEITSAKTIONAREN NACH AMERIKANISCHEM, ENGLISCHEM UND DEUTSCHEM RECHT 
(1992); Marcus Lutter, Die Richtlinie aber Ubernahmeangebote, EUROPAISCHES UN-
TERNEHMENSRECHT (SPECIAL ISSUE 1) 67 (1991); id., DIE TREUEPFLICHT DES AKTIONARS, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR HANDELSRECHT 446 (1989); Hans-Jochen Otto, Ubernahmeversuche bei 
Aktiengesellschaften und Strategien der Abwehr, DER BETRIEB (SPECIAL ISSUE 12) 
(1988); Martin Peltzer, Hostile Takeovers in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 69 (1989); id., Von Raubern, wei{3en Rittern und Jung-
frauen - die Taktiken der amerikanischen Takeovers, ZKW 291 (1986); JORGEN REUL, 
DIE PFLICHT ZUR GLEICHBEHANDLUNG DER AKTIONARE BEl PRIVATEN KONTROLLTRANSAK-
TIONEN, 1991; Jutta Stoll, Rechtliche Aspekte von 'feindlichen' Ubernahmen von Ak-
tiengesellschaften, BETRIEBS-BERATER 301 (1989); CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF EL AL., 
UBERNAHMEANGEBOTE 1M AKTIENRECHT (1976); Peter Wiesner, Stand des Europliischen 
Unternehmensrechts, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EUROPAISCHES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 500 (1993). 
3. Filippo Annunziata, La nuova disciplina dell'OPA in Francia, Rlv. Soc. 1280 
(1992); Guiseppe Carcano, OPA ostili e acquisto "difensivo" di azioni proprie negli Stati 
Uniti, Rlv. Soc. 1238 (1988); Guiseppe Carcano, Acquisto di azioni proprie come tecnica 
di difesa dalle scalate: la CEE rafforza it divieto, Rlv. Soc. 1310 (1992); Giovanni E. 
Colombo, La cessione dei pacchetti di controllo: considerazioni per una discussione, 
Rlv. Soc. 1443 (1978); Renzo Costi, I sindacati di blocco e di voto nella legge Bull'OPA, 
BANCA, BORSA E TIT. CRED. 472 (1992); id., Operazioni intragruppo e OPA obbligatoria, 
GIUR. COMM. 65 (1993); Aldo Frignani, II Leveraged Buyout nel diritto italiano, Giur. 
Comm. 419 (1989); Francesco Galgano, Gruppi di Bocietl!, Insider trading, OPA obbli-
gatoria, CONTR. E IMPR. 637 (1992); Agostino Gambino, L 'Opa e la circolazione del con-
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other European Countries.s Thus Leebron's statement "no 
machination of the corporate or financial world has ever at-
tracted greater attention from lawyers, legal scholars, financial 
economists or the lay press" seems to be very true.' Whoever 
thought that the collapse of the American junk bond market in 
1989 and the related slowdown of hostile takeover activity bat-
tles for corporate control would end battles for corporate control 
was impressively proven wrong by the latest 1980's style take-
over attempt in the media market.s The pattern has changed, 
however. Whereas cash was king during the takeover avalanche 
of the 1980s, stock is now the currency of choice, leading to 
greater shareholder influence in the decision-making process of 
such deals. It does not require much prophetic talent to predict 
that this resurgence of takeover battles will sooner or later end 
in the courts of Delaware9 and, as a result, develop the law on 
takeovers further. With this renaissance of hostile takeover ac-
tivity, it is interesting to look across the Atlantic where the Eu-
ropean Community is about to harmonize the takeover laws of 
trollo all'interno del gruppo, Rlv. Soc. 1249 (1992); Paolo Montalenti, La legge italiana 
sulle offerte pubbliche: prime reflessioni, GIUR. COMM. 831 (1992); Piergaetano 
Marchetti, L'offerta pubblica di Acquisto in Italia, RIV. Soc. 1155 (1971); id., La dis-
ciplina dell'Opa in Germania, RIV. Soc. 837 (1979); id., La nuova disciplina francese 
delle offerte pubbliche, Rlv. Soc. 1031 (1979); id., OPA obbligatoria e circolazione del 
controllo all'interno del gruppo, RIV. Soc. 1258 (1992); Ariberto Mignoli, Riflessioni cri-
tiche sull'esperienza italiana dell'OPA: idee, problemi, proposte, Rlv. Soc. 1 (1986); 
Giuseppe Sbisa, Patto di Sindacato e OPA, CONTR. E IMPR. 653 (1992); Roberto 
Weigmann, La nuova legge italiana sulle offerte pubbliche, BANCA, BORSA E TIT. CRED. 
428 (1992). 
4. Martin and Faugerolas, Securite et transparence du marche financier. Nouveau 
Statut de la C.O.B. Reforme des O.P.A., O.P.E., BULLETIN JOLY Nr. 11bis; Wymeersch, 
Cession de Controle et offres publique obligatoires, REVUE PRATIQUE DES SOCIFn:S 207 
(1991); AGNELLET ET AL., OPA ET STRATtGlES ANTI-OPA, UNE APPROCHE INTERNATIONALE 
(1989); BERTREL and JEANTIN, ACQUISITIONS ET FUSIONS DES socd:Tts COMMERCIAUX. As-
PECTS JURIDIQUES DE L'lNGtNNltRIE FINANCltRE (1989). 
5. D.B. Richard Cooper, In search of flexibility - a british view of the proposed 
takeover directive, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR EUROPAISCHES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 289 (1991); Geof-
frey Morse, New Edition of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, J. Bus. L. 176 
(1991); Geoffrey Morse, The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers - self regulation or 
self protection, J. Bus. L. 509 (1991); PENNINGTON, REPORT ON TAKEOVER AND OTHER BIDS 
(1974). 
6. See the comparative overview of Jan Wouters, Towards a level playing field for 
takeovers in the European Community? An analysis of the proposed Thirteenth Direc-
tive in light of American experiences, 30 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 267 (1993). 
7. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 NYU. L. 
REV. 153 (1986). 
8. See W ALLSTREET JOURNAL of September 21, 1993, at 1: "Mixed Media: QVC's $ 
9.5 Billion Bid for Paramount brings industry Titans to fray". 
9. Since Paramount is a Delaware Company. 
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its Member States. Given the very limited number of compara-
tive articleslO on this issue, it is - at least for the American law-
yer - very tempting to assume that takeover activity everywhere 
in the world is similar to the American process and automati-
cally follows the pattern developed in the United States. This is 
not the case at all in Germany, for example, where to date a US-
style takeover battle has never occured. 
Even though American legal publications do not give very 
much attention to merger and acquisition activities that are not 
directly related to the United States, there are at least two inter-
national aspects that should be considered worthwhile. First, as 
recently shown by the rumors about the German Bertelsman 
Company and whether it will come up with a bid for Para-
mount/I the takeover battles do not remain within national bor-
ders, but rather the game is played on international play-
grounds.12 For American companies this area becomes more and 
more important regardless of whether they seek to enter the 
Community "before 'Fortress Europe' raises its drawbridge or 
whether they wish merely to take greater advantage of the 
strengthened European market".13 Therefore, it is indispensable 
to know the rules observed in other parts of the world. Second, 
it is more than doubtful that the extent of debt-financed take-
over activities found in the United States during the 1980s is 
good as far as the economy as a whole is concerned.14 Antitrust 
10. Even though the lessons one can draw in the field of corporate law from compar-
ative law are somtimes questioned (see, e.g., Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on 
Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law (Symposium: Economic Competi-
tiveness and the Law), 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993», comparative analysis of this subject is 
not only of academic interest. See also Alfred F. Conard, The Supervision of Corporate 
Management: A Comparison of Developments in European Community and United 
States Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1459 (1984); Marc J. Roc, Some Differences in Corporate 
Structure in Germany, Japan and the United States (Symposium: Economic Competi-
tiveness and the Law), 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993). 
11. See "Reinhard Mohn Outlines Legacy For Bertelsmann", WALLSTREET JOURNAL 
of September 24, 1993, p. A 8. 
12. See Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign 
Tender Offers, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 523 (1993). 
13. See Greenbaum, supra note I, at 925 & 926. 
14. The question of whether takeovers are good or bad for the economy as a whole 
and for the companies involved was discussed in 1989, when the takeover activity has 
reached its peekpoint by SEGAL, CORPORATE MAKEOVER (1989), and HOLLAND, WHEN THE 
MACHINE STOPPED (1989) (both reviewed in the WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept. 14, 1989, at 
p. A14), with a totally different result. A short overview of the positive and negative 
aspects of hostile takeovers is given infra accompanying text to footnote 227. When the 
takeover-waive was at its heights in the second half of the 1980s, even the principal role 
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issues are just one aspect, which, however, shall not be discussed 
here. HI 
But there is a whole bundle of other serious concerns,16 for 
example, of whether a permanent takeover threat forces corpo-
rate managers to develop only short term profit-maximizing 
techniques17 and prevent them from developing long term per-
spectives which would serve the company in the long run much 
better. IS It is always interesting to see how foreign countries face 
these problems. The European Community, as part of its com-
pany law harmonization efforts, is about to harmonize the take-
over law in the Community. In 1990, the Commission presented 
an amended Proposal for a Thirteenth Directive on Company 
Law, concerning takeovers and other general bids.19 According to 
the "Bangemann-memorandum" of May 14, 1990, the Commis-
of stock corporations and the institutions of stock exchanges at large were questioned. 
Originally introduced to provide capital for huge enterprises with extensive financial 
needs that could not be met by single persons, more and more, so was argued, they were 
abused by spaculators making corporations their toys, see Manic Market, TIME 44 (Nov., 
1986). Other concernes were the effects of so many highly-leveraged-financed transac-
tions on the economy as a whole. So a commentator in the WALL STREET JOURNAL came 
to the conclusion that the combination of high interest burdens relative to cash flow, 
high default rates of junk bonds, continued low profitability, and workers who more and 
more resist and who are ready to strike easier than in the past makes the whole construc-
tion of the American economy an extremely shaky house built on junk bond sand, see 
Cockburn, U.S. Economy: A House Built on Junk Bond Sand, THE WALL STREET JOUR-
NAL A23 (October 19, 1989). 
15. See Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law through an antitrust lens, 92 COLUM. L. R. 
497 (1992); Jeffrey P. Greenbaum, An American Perspective on the European Commis-
sion's "Amended proposal for a Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings" and its impact on hostile tender offers, 7 DICK. J. INT'L. L. 195 
(1989). 
16. The fact that during the recent years about 40 States of the Union (among them 
Delaware, where more than 50 % of the 500 "Fortune Companies" are incorporated) 
have enacted anti-takeover laws shows that even if these regulations could not stop the 
takeover avalanche at all, also America's lawmakers were concerned about the increasing 
number of deals. For a brief discussion of the mechanics of these anti-takeover statutes, 
see supra note 13. 
17. See Cosh et ai., Takeovers and shorttermism in the UK, Institute for Public 
Policy Research, INDUSTRIAL POLICY PAPER No.3 (1990). 
18. See Hayes and Abernathy, Managing our way to economic decline, Harv. Bus. 
Rev. 67 (July-August 1980); Law, A corporation is more than its stock, HARV. Bus. REV. 
80 (May-June 1986), 80. Lipton, Takeover bids in the target's boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 
101 (1979). For a discussion of this issue see Wouters, supra note 6, at 276. 
19. See Amended Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law 
concerning takeover and other general bids, 1991 OJ No. C 240/7 (September 26, 1990). 
See also Additional Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Amended 
Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law concerning takeovers and 
other general bids, OJ No. C 102/49 (April 18, 1991). 
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sion regards takeover bids20 in general as a positive phenome-
non, because they provoke market selection of the more compet-
itive companies as well as the restructuring of firms. Therefore, 
takeover bids shall be encouraged.21 The purpose of this article 
is to examine whether this directive will eventually lead to US-
Style hostile tender offers and takeover fights in Germany, 
which so far have not been observed.22 It begins with a short 
overview of the mechanics of a typical hostile takeover, then 
outlines the relevant section of the German Stock Corporation 
Act and the law regarding hostile takeovers in Germany. Subse-
quently, a short overview of European company law is given, and 
then a closer look at the proposal for the directive is taken. Its 
main structural differences are briefly compared to the Williams 
Act. Finally, the directive's impact on German company law will 
be discussed. 
II. MECHANICS OF A HOSTILE TAKEOVER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the following, a typical American hostile takeover is dis-
sected into its basic characteristics, each of which is subse-
quently compared to German corporate law. Prior to this, the 
main structural concept of German corporate law is outlined 
with special emphasis given to the roles of shareholders, supervi-
sory board, and board of management in the decision-making 
process of a publicly held corporation. As the concept of a Ger-
man stock corporation cannot be properly understood without 
some basic knowledge about labor co-determination, this is dis-
cussed as well, even though - systematically spoken - it is not 
pure company law.23 
20. The terms takeover bid and tender offer are often used as synonyms, 
eventhough technically spoken, the second term is broader. The first expression is used 
in the United Kingdom, the latter in the United States. 
21. Commission Communication of May 14, 1990 relating to hindrances of public 
takeover or exchange bids: EuropelDocuments (May 17, 1990), No. 1619. 
22. During the last couple of years, there were some hostile takeovers or attempts of 
them, such as KrupplHoesch and ContilPirelli, but they were not done by way of a 
tender offer, but rather by successive acquisition of shares at the stock exchange. 
23. See infra text accompanying note 56. 
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B. TENDER OFFERS 
The game begins, long before the public realizes it, when 
the "raider" is looking for an appropriate target, the suitability 
of which depends on various facts such as market policy, market 
shares, product variety, etc. of both the acquiring and the target 
company.24 After having selected the target, either the "raider" 
proposes a friendly takeover to the target's board or announces 
the tender offer directly without negotiations.21i Therefore, a 
tender offer can be defined as a public offer made by the ac-
quirer (mostly another company or the management team of the 
target company to purchase all or a designated percentage of the 
outstanding common stock of the so-called target company. The 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has suggested an eight-
factor test to determine whether a stock accumulation consti-
tutes a tender offer ("Wellman Eight-Factor Test").26 These 
eight factors are: 
- active and widespread solicitation of public 
shareholders for the issuer's stock, 
- solicitation made for a substantial percentage of 
the issuer's stock, 
- offer to purchase made at a premium over the 
prevailing market price, 
- terms of the offer are firm rather than 
negotiable, 
- offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number 
of shares, and 
- offer often subject to a fixed maximum number 
to be purchased, 
- offer open only for a limited period of time, 
- offeree subject to pressure to sell his stock. 
In the United States a tender offer, like every acquisition of 
stock, must be in accordance with the provisions of the Security 
Exchange Act of 1934, amended by the Federal Williams Act of 
24. See Earl and Fisher, International Mergers and Acquisitions, EUROMONEY 5 
(1986); Bebchuk, The case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Ex-
tension, 35 STAN. L. REV 28 (1982). 
25. Usually in the financial press and within business sections of national wide dis-
tributed newspapers. 
26. This test was applied by the court in Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 
823 -24, (1979). 
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196827 and regulations issued by the SEC thereunder. So, federal 
law provides the rules of the takeover process, whereas the state 
corporate law defines the position of the target.28 The Williams 
Act will be compared briefly to the Proposal of the Commission 
of the European Community for a Thirteenth Directive on 
Takeovers and General Bids in Chapter VII, 1. 29 
C. DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY THE TARGET 
After the announcement of the tender offer, it is the target 
board's turn to react. There are two possibilities: after having 
carefully80 reviewed the conditions of the tender offer the board 
must propose to its shareholders either to accept or to reject the 
offer. As this article deals with hostile takeovers only, solely the 
second case will be discussed, i.e. the board has decided that it is 
in the best interest of the company to not give up its indepen-
dence, and therefore, it will take defensive actions. 
Two categories of defensive measures can be distinguished: 
proactive (pre-offer) and reactive (post-offer) measures. The first 
of which is subdivided into anti-takeover amendments ("by-
laws") and "poison pills." All defensive actions have in common 
particular devices. The target can either make it more difficult 
for the acquiring company to purchase a sufficient amount of 
shares to gain corporate control, make the target less attractive 
for several reasons to the raider, or make it more difficult for the 
raider to exercise corporate control after he has acquired the 
majority of the stock. The legality of the various defensive de-
vices, developed over the years by the boards of attacked targets 
and challenged in the courts by the bidders, is one of the signifi-
cant issues of takeover discussion in the United States. There-
fore, in Chapter IV, 281 the major American defensive devices 
will be outlined and compared to the legal situation in Germany. 
27. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 78m(d) - (e): 78n(d) - (0 (1970). The Williams Act ammended the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act, adding §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(dHO to it. The Williams Act was several 
times amended since, see infra note 106. 
28. See 5 Loss and SELIGMANN, Securities regulation 2127-2128 (1989). 
29. See infra text accomanying note 211. 
30. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, Del. Supr., 488 A.2d. 858 (1985). 
31. See infra text accompanying note 116. 
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D. CHANGE OF CORPORATE CONTROL 
It was characteristic to a 1980's-style leveraged hostile take-
over that the target company itself paid the price for its own 
acquisition. Technically this was accomplished by a merger be-
tween the target and the acquiring company or one of the lat-
ter's subsidiaries ("shell corporations") and a subsequent spin-
off of the target company's assets. The target company is now 
"co-liable" for the debts of the acquiring company, which are a 
result of the acquistion.32 
Thus, it is evident that the change of corporate control -
which under German Law does not necessarily go hand in hand 
with the acquisition of the majority of the shares - is from the 
view of the raider the key to the success of the whole transac-
tion. Only the one who exercises corporate control is able to milk 
the cash-box of the compnay. Therefore, in Chapter IV, 333 the 
concept of corporate control under German Law is outlined and 
subsequently will be analyzed as to where the obstacles lie in 
changing corporate control. One of the main reasons for a lack of 
a US-type hostile takeover activity in Germany will be found 
here. 
32. For a discussion of the Delaware anti-takeover statutes, see Hablutzel and Sel-
mer, supra note 1, at 221 et seq., and Ebenroth and Eyles, Die Beschriinkung von Hos-
tile Takeovers in Delaware, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 413 (1988). Sec-
tion 28(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15.U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988), allows 
a state to regulate securities transaction "insofar as it does not conflict with the provi-
sions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder". Today, various types of 
anti-takeover statutes can be found, the most common one being the "business combina-
tion statute", that typically prevents mergers between a target and another entity for a 
period of three to five years after an offeror has made what management considers to be 
an unacceptable acquisition of a certain percentage of the target's stock, see Greenbaum, 
supra note 1, at 928 note 24 (with several citations for state anti-takeover statutes and a 
discussion of the different kinds of anti-takeover statutes); see also Anjier, supra note 1, 
at 568; SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POLICY 1112 (1982); Coffee, Regulating 
the market for Corporate Control: A critical Assessment of the Tender Offers Role in 
Corporate Governance, 84 COL. L. REV. 1252 (1982); Bainbridge, supra note 1; Romano, 
supra note 1; Greene, supra note 1. 
33. See infra accompanying text to note 140. 
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III. BASIC STRUCTURE OF GERMAN CORPORATE LAW 
A. BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
As in most countries, the law of Germany provides basically 
two different forms of business: partnerships and corporations; 
the most significant legal distinction among them is the legal 
personality of the latter one. Partnerships are the subject of va-
rious regulations of the German Civil Code (BGB)34 and the 
German Commercial Code (HGB)31i but shall not be discussed 
here. 
Germany has two conceptually and significantly different 
forms of corporations, the "Aktiengesellschaft" - AG (stock cor-
poration, publicly held corporation) and the "Gesellschaft mit 
beschrankter Haftung" - GmbH (limited liability company, 
closely held corporation). Similar to the United State's corporate 
law, there are three main consequences36 arising from the corpo-
ration being endowed with a legal personality separate and dis-
tinctive from its members: ·First, the corporation (and not its 
members) is the owner of the corporate assets. This means that 
only the corporation itself is subject to their creditors' claims, 
and the liability of its members is limited to their contributions 
to the corporation, which usually were designated when the cor-
poration was founded. 37 
From this rule only a few exceptions exist, quite similar to 
what is referred to as "piercing the corporate veil" and "instru-
mentality rule" under American law.3s Second, members of the 
corporation and its management are separated by the internal 
organization of the corporation. Therefore, the management is -
at least as a general rule - independent from the owners of the 
corporation. Third, a change in the composition of the corpora-
34. Section 705 ff BGB. 
35. Section 124 ff and 161 ff HGB. 
36. See Peter Behrens, The acquisition of Control over a Corporation, in XIITH 
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 10 (1986). 
37. See sec. 3,5 of the limited liability company act in MUELLER ET AL., GMBH LAW 
(German Text with Synoptic English Translations and Introduction) (1976), and sec. 23 
If of the German Stock Corporation Act, in MUELLER and GALBRAITH, THE GERMAN 
STOCK CORPORATION LAW, (Bilingual Edition with Introduction (2nd ed., 1976). 
38. Another exception are pre-incorporation transactions, see the comparative anal-
ysis of KLAUS HEINEMANN, PRE-INCORPORATION TRANSACTIONS (1990). 
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tion's members does not affect its integrity, and this allows a 
free transferability of the shares. 
The main differences between the AG and the GmbH are 
less rigid separation of management and shareholders,39 the lack 
of a supervisory board,40 and the non-negotiability of the shares 
in case of the GmbH. While the AG clearly is designed for large 
enterprises as far as organizational and financial needs are con-
cerned,"l the limited liability company is the business form for 
smaller enterprises. However, there is no mandatory law for the 
choice between AG and GmbH,4! and many very large compa-
nies today are organized as a GmbH. Although GmbHs could 
theoretically be a target of a takeover attempt as well, the fol-
lowing analysis will focus only on the AG, because the AG is the 
closest equivalent to the American publicly held corporation. 
B. THE CONCEPT OF THE GERMAN PUBLICLY HELD STOCK CORPO-
RATION (AG) 
1. General Introduction to the Stock Corporation Act 
The German publicly held stock corporation (AG) is regu-
lated by the German Stock Corporation Act which first was en-
acted in 1856 and was slightly revised in 1884, 1937 and 1965, 
whereby the main structure is still the same as in 1856.43 This 
act is generally considered - even abroad - to be comprehensive 
and to offer many original solutions to modern corporate 
problems.44 It consists of five books,"6 the first one (sec. 1 - 277) 
dealing mainly with the formation of the AG, with the legal rela-
tion between the company and its shareholders, its constitution, 
accounting and appropriation of the profit, and its dissolution. 
The third book (sec. 291 - 338)46 provides regulations for con-
39. See sec. 37 of the Limited Liability Company Act which provides the right of 
the shareholders to give orders to the management (see MUELLER ET AL., supra note 37). 
40. This is the general rule and there are only a few exceptions (see sec. 52 of the 
limited liability company act). 
41. See Behrens, supra note 36, at 11. 
42. There are only a few exeptions for banking and insurance companies. 
43. See Behrens, supra note 36, at p. 10. 
44. D.F. Vogts, Reforming the modern corporation: Perspectives from the German, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 23, at 64-75 (1966). 
45. See the bilingual edition of the German Stock Corporation Act of MUELLER and 
GALBRAITH, supra note 37. 
46. The second book (sec. 278 - 290) is dealing with the KGaA, a very special form 
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nected enterprises. Book four (sec. 339 - 393) provides regula-
tions for mergers, transfer of assets, and liabilities and changes 
of the legal form of the corporation. The fifth book (sec. 394 -
410) contains special, penal, and final provisions. 
2. Two-Tier Board System and Labor Co-Determination 
Besides the the shareholders' meeting,47 two organs of the 
AG which are independent of each other have to be distin-
quished: the supervisory board48 and the management board.4e 
This model structure represents - at least as long no homoge-
nous interest group dominates the organs - a very well-balanced 
seperation of powersliO within the corporation. Unlike most other 
foreign corporation laws, the German Stock Corporation Act 
does not allow a board of directors in the sense of an integrated 
board of directors consisting of management and non-manage-
ment members. III 
Therefore sec. 105 of the Stock Corporation Act provides: 
"A member of the supervisory board may not si-
multaneously be a member of the board of man-
agement, a permanent deputy of members of the 
board of management, a Prokurist ll2 or a holder of 
a general Hanklungsvollmacht ll3 of the 
association. " 
The management board's task is the day to day operations 
of the company, as well as "policy making" in the sense of the 
American board of directors' duties.1I4 Moreover, the manage-
of a stockcorporation (association limited by shares). 
47. Referred to as "Hauptversammlung" in German language. Its role will be dis-
cussed infra, text accompanying note 93 et seq. 
48. Referred to as "Aufsichtsrat" in German language. See sec 95 if of the Stock 
Corporation Act. 
49. Referred to as "Vorstand" in German language. See sec. 76 if of the Stock Cor-
poration Act. 
50. See Behrens, supra note 36, at 13. 
51. See MUELLER and GALBRAITH, supra note 37, at 10. 
52. "Prokurist" is a holder of a special statuatory authority, called "prokura", see 
sec. 48 of the German commercial code. 
53. "Handlungsvollmacht" is a limited authority as defined in sec. 54 of the German 
commercial code; it may generally be granted for all business transactions or be limited 
to certain divisions of the enterprise or to specific transactions only. 
54. See JUENGER and SCHMIDT, GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT 10 (1967). 
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ment board has, as the executive arm of the corporation, a broad 
power to bind the compnay. This power is not limited by an "ul-
tra virus doctrine,"66 nor can it be limited to certain transactions 
by shareholders' consent. The only restrictions are organic 
changes and enterprise agreements, which are further discussed 
below. 
The supervisory board has no direct equivalent in U.S. cor-
porations. It consists of between three and twenty-one mem-
bers.66 The understanding of its composition - which is the main 
obstacle for US-type hostile takeover activity in Germany - re-
quires a brief look at the basics of labor co-determination.1i7 
The first attempts of German workers to install - in its 
broadest sense - a system of co-determination in Germany took 
place in the middle of the last century; its roots stem from the 
social consequences resulting from the growing industrialization 
of that time. In revolutionary Germany of 1848, a rather socialis-
tic and liberal draft of trade law was proposed, providing for 
workers' representatives, workers' committees, and grievance 
tribunals in the factory. The idea was to give them an influence 
on the determination of their salaries, on dismissals and on the 
selection of their supervisors. However, the draft was not en-
acted, and it took another 45 years until the Business Practice 
Act,1i8 enacted in 1890 for the first time, provided for the crea-
tion of workers' committees, giving the employees an influence 
on the working conditions at their companies. During World 
War I, in 1916, formation of workers' committees became 
mandatory for all enterprises involved in production of military 
55. See Robert Hamilton, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 51 et seq. (2nd 
ed., 1989). When the European Community began to harmonize its Company Law with 
the First Directive of March 9, 1968, this issue was highly controversial and finally be 
settled in Article 9 of this directive ("Publicity Directive", O.J EC No. L 6% of March 
14, 1968; it deals primarily with the uniformity of minimum disclosure provisions for 
company information, both as provided in the commercial register and in th press. More-
over, it addresses issues like validity of commitments made by company organs, and nul-
lity of improperly established companies. 
56. For some reasons it must always be divisible by three see sec. 95 of the Stock 
Corporation Act. 
57. A rather comprehensive overview of co-determination in Germany and its his-
tory in English language can be found by Hartmut Dietrich, Co-Determination, in 3/31 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY (Bernd RUster ed., looseleaf as of 1993) The follow-
ing outline refers to it. 
58. Referred to as "Gewerbeordnung" in German language. 
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equipment. The Weimar Constitution of 1919119 created a major 
breakthrough for the workers' movement by providing in Article 
165 that the employees shall cooperate with the employers on an 
equal basis in the regulation of wages and work conditions and 
in the economic development of the productive forces. This led 
in 1920 to the enactment of the Works Council Act60 which pro-
vided, in addition, a second form of co-determination, the par-
ticipation of one or two workers' councils on the supervisory 
board of the company. This was the beginning of co-determina-
tion as far as the companies' decision-making was concerned. 
Whereas the first form is referred to as co-determination at the 
working level,61 the second form is called enterprise co-determi-
nation.62 More or less abolished by the National Socialists,63 
both forms of co-determination were reinstalled immediately af-
ter World War II by the Allied Control Council. 64 
The next important step in the development of labor co-
determination occured in 1947, when the British Military Au-
thority issued exemplary articles of association for the compa-
nies under its control engaged in the steel and iron business. Ac-
cording to these articles of association, the supervisory board 
consisted of an equal number of shareholders and labor-repre-
sentatives, and one member (often but not necessarily the chair-
man) had to be a "neutral person," enjoying the confidence of 
both the capital and the labor faction. In addition to that, one 
member of the management board, the so-called labor director, 
responsible for all social and personnel matters of the company611 
could neither be appointed nor removed without the agreement 
of the labor representatives of the supervisory board. This was a 
major extention of co-determination as it had existed so far, be-
cause now the employees had influence on the management 
board. After the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany 
59. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs of August 11, 1919 (Reich Law Gazette = 
RGBI. 1919, p. 1383), referred to as "Weimarer Verfassung" in German language. 
60. Betriebsrategesetz of February 2, 1920 (Reich Law Gazette = RGBI. 1920 I, p. 
147). 
61. Referred to as "Betriebliche Mitbestimmung" in German language. 
62. Referred to as "Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung" in German language. 
63. For further reference see Dietrich, supra note 57, at 31·8. 
64. See Allied Control Council Act no. 22/Works Council Act of April 4, 1946 (Law 
Gazette of the Allied Control Council = Amtsblatt des Kontrollrates 1946 No.6, p. 133). 
65. Or director of the personnel, referred to as "Arbeitsdirektor" in German 
language. 
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in 1949, the labor unions demanded, and finally under the threat 
of a general strike prevailed in extending this model of co-deter-
mination to the companies of the coal mining business.88 Later 
attempts to apply these principles to all types of industries 
failed; but the Shop Constitution Act of 195287 was passed, rein-
stalling the co-determination approach taken in the Allied Con-
trol Council Act No. 22 of 194688 with works councils on the fac-
tory level and for certain larger companies with a supervisory 
board with one-third of its members being labor representatives. 
The Shop Constitution Act of 197289 improved only the co-de-
termination on the factory level by granting further rights to the 
works councils, but left unchanged the one-third employee rep-
resentation on the supervisory board. 
The last major development took place in 1976, when the 
Co-Determination Act of 1976 was passed,70 providing for a 
near-parity composition of the supervisory board in all compa-
nies with more than 2000 employees. Here, the supervisory 
board consisted of an equal number of shareholder and labor 
representatives, but other than in the coal mining and steel in-
dustry, no "neutral person" existed. In case of a tie, the chair-
man, who is elected by the shareholders, had the deciding vote. 
In all corporations with more than 500 and less than 2000 em-
ployees the supervisory board consisted of two-thirds of share-
holder representatives and one-third of labor representatives.71 
No co-determination on the enterprise level existed in compa-
nies employing less than five hundred people. 
It is important to notice that all members of the supervisory 
board have equal rights. Two of them together are able to call a 
66. Act concerning the co-determination of employees in supervisory boards and 
boards of management in the mining and iron and steel producing industries of May 21, 
1951 (Federal Law Gazette = BGBl. 1951 I p. 347, as amended on May 21,1981 (Federal 
Law Gazette = BGBl. 1981 I 441), referred to as "Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz" in 
German language. For further reference see Dietrich, supra note 57, at 31-9. 
67. Shop Constitution Act of October 11, 1952 (Federal Law Gazette = BGBl. 1952 
I p. 681), referred to as "Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952". 
68. See supra note 64. 
69. Shop Constitution Act of January 15, 1972 (Federal Law Gazette = BGBl. 1972 
I p. 13), referred to as "Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972". 
70. Act concerning the co-determination of Employees of May 4, 1976 (Federal Law 
Gazette = BGBl. 1976 I p. 1153), referred to as "Mitbestimmungsgesetz" in German 
language. 
71. With some rare exceptions. 
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board meeting or force the management to report on specific is-
sues to the supervisory board.72 And, most importantly, the su-
pervisory board appoints, removes, and supervises the manage-
ment board, but it is not allowed to direct the management to 
concrete business measures. The supervisory board has the right, 
however, to make some important types of transactions, depen-
dent on its approval which, in the case that it is denied, can be 
substituted by a shareholders' voting. The board of management 
is obligated to permanently report to the supervisory board. In 
order to avoid conflicts of interests, Sec. 112 of the Stock Corpo-
ration Act provides. that the AG is represented by the manage-
ment board in case of conflicts between the AG and the mem-
bers of the supervisory board, while the latter represents theAG 
in case of conflicts between the AG and the board of 
management. 
3. The Roles of the Shareholders, the Supervisory Board, and 
the Board of Management in the Process of Corporate Deci-
sion-Making 
As is known from American hostile takeovers, the question 
of separation of power between board of directors and share-
holders plays an important role. A good example is the Time-
Paramount case73 where the originally planned stock-swap 
merger between Time and Warner, which would have been sub-
ject to shareholders' approval, was as a consequence of the Para-
mount tender offer changed into a cash merger not subject to 
shareholders' approval. This situation shows the very limited 
role shareholders play in the corporate decision-making process 
according to American corporate law and also exemplifies how 
easy it is for the board of directors to relegate the shareholders 
to the background, even if fundamental changes in the existence 
of the corporation are in question. Unocal74 and Van Gorkom711 
show that the board of directors is basically free in its choice of 
defensive measures after a takeover bid, unless the "business 
jugdement rule" is violated, and indicate that most of the defen-
72. See sec. 90 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
73. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d. 114 (Del. 1989). See 
Burns, supra note 1. 
74. Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., Del. Supr., 493 A.2d. 946 (1985). 
See, for further details, Grannis, supra note 1. 
75. Smith v. Van Gorkom, Del. Supr. 488 A2d. 858 (1985). 
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sive devices do not require shareholders' approvaL's Even 
though this is not the reason for the takeover activity, it is - at 
least to a certain extent - the reason for takeover battles which 
are often very costly for the target company. As discussed fur-
ther below, the situation is quite different under German corpo-
rate law" as well as the approach taken by the Proposal of the 
Commission of the EC for a Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers 
and General Bids.78 
Before the basic elements of a typical U.S. hostile takeover 
and, in particular, the defensive measures and the would-be an-
swers of German law are discussed, it is necessary to take a brief 
look how the power of decision-making is separated and bal-
anced between the three organs of the German stock 
corporation. 
a. Management Board 
As already mentioned above the management board is the 
executive organ of the company which directs and represents the 
company in and out of court.79 In accordance with a principle of 
all German business associations, the Stock Corporation Act, as 
well, makes a clear distinction between internal management80 
and external representation.81 Section 77 provides that all deci-
sions of internal management require a majority of the votes of 
all members of the management board, whereby each member 
has just one vote. This means the chairman is just "primus inter 
pares" or first among equals. This is mandatory law and cannot 
be changed by the articles of association. It shall be noticed, 
however, that in many German stock corporations it is an old 
76. For the application of the business judgement rule see also Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A2d., 180 (Del. 1986); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A2d. 
805, 812 (Del. 1984); Mills Acqusition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. 559 A2d.1261, 1279 (Del. 
1989); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A 2d. 180, 187 (Del. 1988); see also Block et aI., The role of 
the business judgement rule in shareholder litigation at the tum of the decade, 45 Bus. 
LAW. 469, at 489-490 (1990); Gilson and Kraakman, What triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 37, 59 (1990). For a discussion of the cases see also Wouters, supra note 
6, at 295 et seq. 
77. See infra accompanying text to note 116 
78. See infra accompanying text to note 180. 
79. See sec. 76,78 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
80. Referred to as "Geschiiftsfilhrung" in German language. 
8l. Referred to as "Vertretung" in German language. 
17
Donath: Hostile Tender Offers in Germany
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
108 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMP LAW [Vol. 1:91 
tradition that all decisions are made unanimously.82 As far as 
external representation is concerned, the management board is 
only authorized to represent the association jointly, but the arti-
cles of association may provide differently.8s Most of the consti-
tutions of AGs determine that the company can be represented 
only either jointly by two members of the board, or by one mem-
ber acting jointly with a "prokurist".84 Section 82 of the Stock 
Corporation Act provides that the authority of the board of 
management to represent the corporation externally cannot be 
limited. Only as far as internal management is concerned must 
the board remain within the limitations determined by the arti-
cles of association, the supervisory board or the shareholders.811 
b. Supervisory Board 
The supervisory board does not have a direct influence on 
the day to day decisions of the company. Section 111(4) of the 
Stock Corporation Act provides that measures of the manage-
ment cannot be conferred upon the supervisory board. Its pri-
mary task - as implicated by its name - is to oversee the man-
agement board which is obligated to keep the former informed 
of the plans of the corporation, about the financial and economic 
situation, and about major business transactions.86 As already 
mentioned, the supervisory board, rather than the shareholders, 
appoints and removes the members of the management board.8'1 
They are appointed for a maximum of five years, and - as far as 
takeovers are concerned - it is important to notice that the su-
pervisory board may revoke the appointment of one or several 
members of the management board only for cause, which is a 
gross violation of duties, incapability of proper management or a 
withdrawal of confidence by the shareholders, unless the confi-
dence has been withdrawn for obviously arbitrary reasons.88 
82. A prominent example for this tradition is the Deutsche Bank. one of the largest 
German stock corporations in terms of business assets. 
83. See sec. 78(1) of the Stock Corporation Act. 
84. See supra note 52. 
85. This solution is completely different from the ultra vires doctrine; see supra 
note 55. 
86. See sec. 90 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
87. See sec. 84 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
88. See sec. 84(3) of the Stock Corporation Act. 
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As pointed out above,89 according to co-determination law, 
the supervisory board consists of two factions, the labor repre-
sentatives and the shareholders. While the labor representatives 
are elected by the employees of the corporation in a complicated 
procedure,90 t~e shareholders' representatives are elected at the 
shareholders' meeting, usually for the maximum allowed period 
of five years.91 Their removal prior to the expiration of their 
term of office requires a majority, at least three-fourths of the 
votes cast, but the articles of association may determine a differ-
ent majority and additional requirements.92 
c. Shareholders' Meeting93 
The shareholders are the third organ of the AG. Their role 
in the corporate decision-making process must be viewed against 
the background of the corporate principle with its two contra-
dictory streams: property of the shareholders and independence 
of the association. The corporation is owned by its shareholders; 
each and every share represents (not legally but pictorally) a 
small part of the corporate assets. The consideration for the 
"borrowing" of this ideal part is the annual dividend, and in the 
case the corporation is dissolved, the shareholders receive that 
part of the total value that represents their amount of shares. 
But unlike the usual kind of property, the rights flowing out of 
this property have to be limited, otherwise the association would 
not be able to properly operate. Technically this limitation is 
reached by representation. The shareholders elect representa-
tives who exercise for a certain period of time the ownership 
rights of the stockholders on their behalf. Therefore, the more 
weight given to the ownership aspect, the more limited is the 
association in independently conducting its business. The more 
weight given to the limitation aspect, the less important are the 
ownership rights and the freer the directors are in corporate de-
cision-making. The principle task of a corporation law is to set-
tle this conflict by a reasonable compromise. According to Sec. 
89. See supra note 57. 
90. The procedural provisions for this election are provided for in the various co-
determination acts, see sec. 101 of the Stock Corporation Act. For further details see 
Dietrich, supra note 57. 
91. See sec. 102(1) of the Stock Corporation Act. 
92. See sec. 103 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
93. See sec. 118 ff of the Stock Corporation Act. 
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134 of the Stock Corporation Act the shareholders' voting rights 
are exercised in relation to the nominal amounts of the share 
holding.9• Unless otherwise determined by the article of associa-
tion, generally the resolutions of the shareholders require a (sim-
ple) majoirty of the votes cast, but in some important cases the 
law requires a greater majority. As far as hostile takeovers are 
concerned the most important supermajority clauses provided 
by the law are the following: for all amendments of the articles 
of association, a majority of three-fourths9~ of the votes cast is 
required. The same majority is necessary for all major structural 
changes, like increases of the share capital,96 the provision for 
conditional97 and for authorized98 capital, the issue of converti-
ble bonds,99 capital decreases,100 and the dissolution of the com-
pany. Moreover, the three-fourths majority is required for enter-
prise contracts101 and all kinds of mergers.102 In all these cases 
the law allows the articles of association to determine additional 
requirements. Because of the three-fourths requirement for all 
major changes, the holding of more than one-fourth of the share 
capital is called "blocking minority".I03 In this context, another 
particularity of German corporate and capital market law must 
be briefly mentioned. From the beginning of the development of 
corporations, in Germany the banks10• have handled the sale and 
purchase of shares. They hold them for the shareholders, collect 
the dividends, and exercise the voting rights on their behalf, un-
94. However, one important restriction exists, referred to as "Stimmrecht-
sbeschriinkungen" in German language. Section 134(1) of the stock corporation act pro-
vides, in part, as follows: "The voting right is exercised pursuant to the nominal amounts 
of shares. In case a shareholder owns several shares the articles of association may limit 
the voting right by determining a maximum amount or graduations. In addition the arti-
cles of association may determine that the shares which belong to another person for the 
account of a shareholder shall be counted together with the shares owned by the share-
holder .... The limitations may not be determined with regard to individual sharehold-
ers. The limitations are not considered for the calculation of a capital majority required 
by the law or the articles of association." 
95. See sec. 179 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
96. See sec. 182, 207 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
97. See sec. 193 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
98. See sec. 202 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
99. See sec. 221 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
100. See sec. 222, 229 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
101. See sec. 293 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
102. See sec. 340c, 353 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
103. Referred to as "Sperrminoritat" in German language. 
104. Germany does not distinguish between investment banks and other banks. The 
banks are universial banks, allowed to be engaged in all kinds of financial services. 
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less otherwise determined by them. 1011 
IV. US-HOSTILE-TAKEOVER-PATTERN AND THE GER-
MAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT 
A. TENDER OFFERS 
1. Legal Situation in the United States (Overview) 
Since 1968 when the Federal Williams Act came into force 
to complete the Securities Exchange Actl06 the SEC issued de-
tailed rules for stock purchases in the context of takeovers and, 
in particular, for tender offers.107 Section 13(d) provides that an-
yone, notwithstanding a private person or a corporation, who 
has acquired more than 5% of the common stock of a corpora-
tion within a period of ten days must inform the corporation, 
the stock exchange where the purchase took place, and the SEC. 
Section 14e - 14g dealing with tender offers in particular, pro-
vide that anyone who wants to acquire more than 5% of the 
common stock of a corporation by means of a tender offer must 
inform in advance - this means before the tender offer is pub-
licly announced - the SEC, the target company, and its stock-
holders. lOB This information must include the identity of the of-
feror, the source of the money required for the transaction, the 
present amount of his stake in this company, and his future in-
tentions with the target after the takeover as far as fundamental 
changes in the corporate structure are concerned.109 The man-
agement of the target company is obligated to give to its share-
holders a statement of assessment of the takeover bid.110 
2. Legal Situation in Germany 
No binding tender offer rule exists in Germany to date. 111 
105. Referred to as "Depotstimmrecht der Banken"; see sec. 128, 134, 135 of the 
Stock Corporation Act. See also Lutter and Lammers, "Hostile takeovers: Possibilities 
and limitations according to German law, in DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST HOSTILE TAKE-
OVERS IN THE COMMON MARKET 134 (Maeijer and Geens eds., 1990). 
106. 15 U.S.C.A. sec. 78m(d) - (g); 78(d) - (g) [1988]. For the legal history see supra 
note 27. 
107. See ROBERT HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE 979 et seq. (1989). 
108. See rule 14d - 5 (17 C.F.R. § 240. 14d.5)[1988]. 
109. See rule 13d - 1 (17. C.F.R. § 240 13 d. -1)[1988]. 
110. See rule 14e - 2 (17 C.F.R. § 240. 14 e - 2)[1988]. 
111. For the reasons see C. E. Hauschka and T. Roth, Ubernahmeangebote und 
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The only provision in that context is Sec. 20 of the Stock Corpo-
ration Act that provides that any enterprise that has acquired 
more than 25% of the shares of an AG ("blocking majority") 
must inform the corporation. ll2 Besides that provision, there are 
only voluntary guidelines113 published in 1979 by the Stock Ex-
change Committee of Experts, which is affiliated with the Fed-
eral Minister of Finance. These guidelines provide, in part, that 
- all shareholders of the target company must be 
treated equally, even though the offer price for 
the shares is raised during the transaction,114 
- the bidder shall inform the management of the 
target and all stock exchanges where the shares of 
the target are traded prior to his publk offer, 
- no insider trading shall be allowed prior to the 
announcement of the offer, 
- the conditions of the offer shall be published 
comprehensively, 
- a tender offer shall be valid between 21 and 60 
days. 
Because these are only voluntary guidelines, no system for 
policing and enforcing exists, which in fact makes the conduct of 
a tender offer in Germany untrammeled. This legal situation will 
change in the years to come when the Proposal of the Commis-
sion of the European Community for a Thirteenth Directive will 
enter into force. I III But experience from the past proves that it is 
a very long way from a proposal of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Community to mandatory law within the single Member 
States. 
B. DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY THE TARGET116 
In the following, the most common defensive devices devel-
deren Abwehr im deutschen Recht, DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 181 (1988). 
112. See Peltzer, Hostile Takeovers, supra note 2, at 73. 
113. See MacLachlan and Mackesy, Acquisitions of Companies in Europe - Practi-
cability, Disclosure and Regulation: An Overview, 23 Bus. LAW 373, 392 (1989). The 
guidelines are published in BAUMBACH ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM HANDELSGESETZBUCH An-
nex 18 (28th ed., 1989). 
114. This is very similar to the "best price rule" stipulated in sec. 14 e (7) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 n (d)(7) (1988). 
115. See infra accompanying text to note 182. 
116. See P.W. RICHTER, CORPORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES: THE POISON PILL DEVICE 
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oped over the years by "attacked" US-corporations and often 
challenged in the courts are briefly explained and subsequently 
compared to German corporate law. Two different types of de-
fense-devices will be distinguished, pre-offer measures (part a) 
and post-offer measures (part b).l17 
1. Proactive (pre-offer) Measures 
a. Anti-takeover Amendments 
Many American companies have adopted staggered board 
provisions. They divide the firm's board of directors into sec-
tions and only one section stands for election each year. A typi-
cal provision divides the board into three sections, each serving 
a three year term. By way of these provisions takeover actions 
are hindered, because a majority stockholder must wait two 
years before being able to obtain majority representation on the 
company's board and to present the merger proposal for stock-
holder vote. us Usually a period fo two years is much too long for 
a "raider" to wait, because the takeover is financed with bor-
rowed money that must be paid back as soon as possible, the 
merger being a prerequisite. 
In Germany, staggered board provisions are also possible,u9 
but practically do not exist.120 Because of the two-tier board sys-
tem and the principle of co-determination, there is no need for 
them to prevent a takeover. As pointed out above, the supervi-
sory board appoints and removes the management, which virtu-
ally exercises corporate control. However, only half of the mem-
bers of the supervisory board are shareholder representatives; a 
three-fourths majority resolution of the shareholders' meeting is 
required for removal prior to the regular expiration of their term 
of office. The other half of the supervisory board's members can-
(1987); From the German point of view, see Ebenroth and Rapp, supra note 2, at 2 et 
seq.; Assmann et aI., supra note 2, at 22; Falkenhausen, supra note 2; ; Joussen, supra 
note 2; KNOLL, supra note 2; Lutter, Die Treuepf!icht des Aktionlirs, supra note 2; Otto, 
supra note 2; Peltzer, Hostile Takeovers, supra note 2; id., Von Rliubern, wei/3en Rittern 
und Jungfrauen, supra note 2; REUL. supra note 2; Stoll, supra note 2; SCHMITfHOFF ET 
AL., supra note 2. 
117. For a overview of defensive tactics see Wouters, supra note 6. 
118. See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 32; Depser, supra note 2, at 355. 
119. See Hauschka and Roth, supra note 110, at 188. 
120. See Peltzer, Hostile Takeovers, supra note 2, at 75. 
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not be removed without the employees' approval. The employee 
representatives on the supervisory board will only cooperate 
with a "raider" if they are convinced that the plans of the ac-
quiring company are for the benefit of the employees, which in a 
highly leveraged buyout will hardly be the case.121 
Supermajority merger approval provisions which are a 
rather common defensive device in American companies require 
approval by an abnormally large number of share votes for 
mergers or other transactions involving interested parties or sub-
stantial stockholders. A substantial stockholder is usually de-
fined as any entity with an equity holding equal to or greater 
than 5 % of the firms outstanding common stock. 122 
In Germany, Sec. 340(c) of the Stock Corporation Act pro-
vides a three-fourths majority requirement of a resolution of the 
shareholders' meeting for any merger transaction. The articles of 
association may determine a higher majority and additional 
requirements. 
Fair merger price provisions123 stipulate a minimum shareprice 
in mergers for those who tender their shares later, i.e. after the 
"raider" has obtained the majority of the stock. According to 
these provisions, all shareholders must receive the price paid by 
the "raider" to acquire the majoirty. As a defensive device these 
provisions serve to avoid a "stampede effect" among the share-
holders after the takeover bid, which would facilitate the raider 
in obtaining the majority of the stock. 
In Germany, fair price provisions are unknown and not nec-
essary,124 because Sec. 340 and 340(b) of the Stock Corporation 
At provide that the consideration for the shares of stockholders, 
who tender their shares after a merger, must be evaluated by 
neutral experts. Therefore, it is not possible to buy their stock 
for a price lower than the fair market value. 
121. See Falkenhausen, supra note 2, at 195; Martin Peltzer, Takeovers in den Ver-
einigten Staaten, Konnen ihre Spielregeln ubertragen werden?, in FESTSCHRIFT F. ZIM-
MERER 271, at 282 (1986). 
122. See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 32, at 1135 et seq.; Depser, supra note 2, at 
353. 
123. See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 32, at 1132 et seq.; Depser, supra note 2, at 
355. 
124. See Hauschka and Roth, supra note 111, at 189. 
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Anti-takeover provisions make sense only if the "raider" 
cannot change them after having obtained the majority of the 
stock. Therefore, lockup-provisions require a supermajority ap-
proval to repeal anti-takeover amendments or limit the number 
of directors. This prevents the new majority stockholder from 
diluting incumbent directors' voting power by filling the board 
with directors of his choice.l2Ii 
In Germany, Sec. 179 of the Stock Corporation Act provides 
that for each amendment of the articles of association a resolu-
tion of the shareholders is necessary, which requires at least a 
majority of three-fourths of the share capital represented at the 
passing of the resolution. Furthermore, the articles of association 
may require a different majority and additional requirements. 
Increasing authorized share of common stock is another pre-
offer defensive technique used by American companies.126 In or-
der to increase the amount of shares necessary to have a control-
ling interest in the firm the board can sell stock for cash. For the 
acquiring company this defensive device results in substantially 
higher costs for the takeover than planned. 
In Germany, the Stock Corporation Act also provides the 
possibility of increasing the share capital.127 The articles of asso-
ciation may authorize the board of management to increase the 
share capital up to a certain nominal amount ("authorized capi-
tal") by issuing new shares against contributions. However, the 
Stock Corporation Act provides that the amount of the author-
ized capital may not exceed one-half of the share capital existing 
at the date of the authorization and that the new shares shall 
not be issued without the consent of the supervisory board. 
Moreover, the act states that the authorization may require that 
the board of management is to decide on any exclusion of the 
preemptive rights.126 
Golden parachutes are contractual agreements between top 
managers and the corporation which guarantee them a certain 
125. See SOLOMON ET AL .• supra note 32, at 1135 et seq.; see also Depser, supra note 
2, at 354. 
126. See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 32, at 1135 et seq.; Depser, supra note 2, at 
.354. 
127. See sec. 202 if of the Stock Corporation Act. 
128. Generally each shareholder must at his request be allocated a part of the new 
shares corresponding to his part of the existing share capital, see sec. 186 of the Stock 
Corporation Act. 
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amount of money in the event of a takeover. The reasoning be-
hind this is that directors will think and act in the stockholders' 
interest rather than in their own interest in the case of a tender 
offer. Moreover, these golden parachutes can make up a substan-
tial part of the takeover costs. This means that this amount of 
money has to be paid by the corporation and therefore is not 
available for paying back the acquisition debts. 
Golden parachutes are not possible under German law, for 
either of the boards. The salary of the members of the supervi-
sory board is assessed in the articles of association or granted by 
the shareholders. The compensation shall remain within an ade-
quate relation to the duties of the members of the supervisory 
board and to the situation of the corporation.129 No sharehold-
ers' meeting would ever accept a salary of such a high amount, 
though it is a significant obstacle for a proposed takeover, be-
casue it is only for the benefit of this particular member and not 
for that of the corporation as a whole. ISO As far as the compensa-
tion of the members of the board of management is concerned, 
the Stock Corporation Act provides that the supervisory board 
shall determine the aggregate compensation of the individual 
members of the management board (salary, profit sharing, com-
pensation for expenses, insurance premiums, commissions and 
fringe benefits of any kind) in such a way that the total compen-
sation keeps within reasonable relation to the duties of the 
members of the management board and to the situation of the 
association. This applies accordingly to pensions and considera-
tions of related kinds. Both the accepting of an unreasonable 
high salary by a member of the management board and the 
granting of such a salary by the supervisory board is considered 
to be a violation of their respective duties, resulting for both in 
joint and several liability to the association for the resulting 
demages.13l Finally Sec. 84 provides that the maximum term of 
office for the members of both boards is five years. Any provi-
sion which would lead directly or indirectly to a prolongation 
would be null and void. 132 
129. See sec. 113 of the Stock Corporation Act. 
130. See Hauschka and Roth, supra note 111, at 192; Peltzer, Hostile Takeover, 
supra note 2, at 74. 
131. See sec. 116, 93 of the Stock Corporation Act; Hauschka and Roth, supra note 
110, at 192. 
132. See Peltzer, Hostile Takeover, supra note 2, at 74. 
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Buy-ops133 are the repurchase of the company's own stock in 
the open market over a certain period of time. These shares are 
then put into a so-called ESOP, i.e. Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan, for later distribution to the employees (and sometimes also 
to the directors) of the firm. By way of such a repurchase shares 
are removed from the open market which remove them from the 
grasp of a potential "raider" and place them into friendly hands; 
as a result, the risk of a hostile takeover is reduced. 
Buy-ops are not possible under German corporate law, be-
cause, as a general rule, German stock corporations are not al-
lowed to deal in their own shares. Section 71 of the Stock Corpo-
ration Act provides that the corporation may only acquire its 
own shares if the acquisition is necessary to avert severe damage 
from the association or when the shares shall be offered for ac-
quisition to the employees. 134 The change of the ownership of 
the corporation is not considered to be severe damage in that 
sense. 1311 However, the aggregate nominal amount of the shares 
acquired for these purposes may not exceed 10% of the whole 
share capital, together with the amount of other shares the cor-
poration has already acquired and still holds. The Stock Corpo-
ration Act provides further that these regulations cannot be cir-
cumvented by using a dependent corporation for acquisition-of-
own-stock purposes. 
h. Poison PillS138 
This is a defensive device adopted by a firm's board, which 
usually does not require shareholders' approval. Poison pills 
consist of preferred stock right plans. These shares are issued to 
shareholders and remain inactive until "triggered" by a certain 
event, typically a tender offer for a large fraction of the firm 
(30%) or the accumulation of a large amount of the firm's com-
mon stock in the hands of a single shareholder. Usually the 
133. See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 32, at 1132 et seq.; Depser, supra note 2, at 
355. 
134. There are some other rare exceptions which are of no interest in this context 
(see sec. 71 subsec. 1 No. 3,4 of the Stock Corporation Act). 
135. See Hauschka and Roth, supra note Ill, at 187; FaIkenhausen, supra note 2, 
at 195. 
136. See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 32, at 1132 et seq.; Depser, supra note 2, at 
355. 
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firm's board can redeem the rights for a specific period of time 
after the triggering event occurs. There are two different types 
of rights: flip over plans and flip in plans. Flip over plans give 
the shareholders of the target company the right to purchase 
preferred stock which is convertible to common stock of the bid-
ding firm in the event of a takeover and a subsequent merger. 
Flip in plans allow the issuing corporation to repurchase the 
rights from the shareholders at a large premium, whereby the 
"raider" is excluded from the repurchase. 
These alternatives are not allowed under German law for 
two reasons. First, both plans would violate Sec. 53(a) of the 
Stock Corporation Act which provides that all shareholders 
must be treated equally.ls7 Second, flip over plans are not in ac-
cordance with the general principle of German law which does 
not allow the creation of contracts which disadvantage a third 
party. 
2. Reactive (post-offer) Measures 
a. Share Repurchases 
As already noted above, German stock corporations are not 
allowed, in general, to deal in their own shares; only a few excep-
tions from this rule exist; takeover threats are not among them. 
Therefore, neither repurchases from "regular" shareholders in 
order to reduce the amount of common stock in the open market 
nor repurchases from a "raider" in order to finish the takeover 
action ("greenmailing" or "good-bye kisses") are allowed. 
b. Pac man Defensel88 
In this less common defensive device, the target company 
initiates a tender offer of its own for the offeror. In general, a 
pac man situation is also possible under German law. However, 
Sec. 328 of the Stock Corporation Act provides that if a stock 
corporation and another enterprise constitute mutually partici-
pating enterprises, the rights from the participation of the other 
137. See Hauschka and Roth, supra note 111, at 190, Peltzer, supra note 121, at 
284; GODIN and WILHELMI, KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTG § 11 note 2.8 (4th ed., 1971). 
138. See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 32, at 1132 et seq.; Depser, supra note 2, at 
355. 
28
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 1 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol1/iss1/5
1994] HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS IN GERMANY 119 
enterprise may only be exercised in the maximum of one-fourth 
of the aggregate stock of the other company.lS9 
c. White Knight 
In this defensive technique arrangements are made for the 
target to be bought by a "friendly" company. 
The aid of a "white knight" is also possible under German 
law and does not create any legal problems.140 
d. Sale of Crown Jewels 
Here, after the tender offer, the target's management sells 
the most valuable assets of the company or those assets which 
were of particular interest to the bidder. 
Crown jewel options as well do not create any legal 
problems under German corporate law, unless all the assets of 
the corporation are sold. In that case, the manufacturing com-
pany becomes a holding company. This requires the approval of 
the shareholders according to Sec. 361 of the Stock Corporation 
Act. 
e. Corporate Suicide 
This is the most radical "defensive device", because the 
company is dissolved. 
In Germany, Sec. 262 of the Stock Corporation Act provides 
that the dissolution of the company requires the approval of the 
shareholders with a majority of at least three-fourths of the cap-
ital represented at the passing of the resolution. 
3. Change of Corporate Control 
As mentioned before the transfer of corporate control is the 
essential part of the whole hostile takeover process, because only 
139. See Hauschka and Roth, supra note Ill, at 193. 
140. Ibid. 
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the one who exercises corporate control can force a merger which 
is necessary to finance the whole transaction. In the United 
States, under the corporate law of most states, at least as a gen-
eral rule, the majority shareholder is able to exercise corporate 
control in that sense. 
Under German law,141 however, this is not the case at all, for 
several reasons. First, the two-tier board system does not allow 
even the majority shareholder to exercise corporate control. The 
management board which virtually has control over the corpora-
tion is appointed and removed by the supervisory board, not by 
the shareholders. Second, the rules of co-determination make it 
very difficult for the majority shareholder to gain ,control over 
the supervisory board in a short period of time, because only 
half of its members are shareholder representatives. Conse-
quently, the second half cannot be removed or forced to agree to 
remove a certain board of management, but rather they only can 
be convinced by sound economic arguments with heavy empha-
sis on employees' benefits.142 In case of a leveraged buyout with 
the prospect of a company over its head in debt and therefore on 
the permanent verge banktruptcy, it is hardly suitable to make 
them agree to such a transaction. Third, all major structural 
changes in German stock corporations require a three-fourths 
majority resolution of the shareholders so that a "blocking mi-
nority shareholder" - which exists very often in Germany - is an 
insurmountable obstacle for the take over of corporate control. 
V. OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LA W143 
A. IDEA OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW: HARMONIZING RATHER 
THAN UNIFYING 
With the beginning of industrialization in the nineteenth 
141. See Otto, supra note 2. 
142. As far as the decisive vote of the chairman, who is a representative of the 
shareholders, unless the company is engaged in the coal mining and steel industry, is 
concerned, see infra text after footnote 221. 
143. See Stith, supra note 1, 1581; Erik Werlauff, The Development of Community 
Company Law, 17 EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 207 (1992); ROBERT R DRURY and PETER G, 
XUEREB, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS - A COMPARATIVE ApPROACH (1991); ROBERT PEN-
NINGTON and FRANK WOOLDRIDGE, COMPANY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (3rd ed., 
1982); FRANK WOOLDRIDGE, COMPANY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY: ITS HARMONIZATION AND UNIFICATION (1991); CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, THE 
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century, different company laws in the European States began 
to develop. Even though the basic concepts of the various com-
pany laws are quite similar,144 there are considerable differences 
in detail, e.g. founding of corporations, minimum capital and 
raising of capital by corporations, and the representation of the 
corporation. Setting up a common market1411 which is the major 
interim goal of the European Community, requires the creation 
of equal conditions for all companies conducting business in this 
market. One possible way for this would be a unified company 
law effective in all Member States of the Community; another 
one is to harmonize the different laws only to the extent neces-
sary. For several reasons, the drafters of the Treaty of Rome 
(hereinafter EC-Treaty)146 have opted almost exclusively147 for 
the latter alternative in the field of company law. 
The Commission's Proposal of the Thirteenth Council Di-
rective on Company Law can be understood only if the frame-
work of European company law is clear. Therefore, in the follow-
ing, the "constitutional level," meaning the provisions of the 
EC-Traty dealing directly or indirectly with company law, is 
outlined and subsequently a short overview of the law is pro-
vided on the harmonized law to date and the proposed 
measures. 
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEVEL: EC-TREATY PROVISIONS 
Article 2 of the EC-Treaty provides that the Community 
shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and pro-
gressively approximating the economic policies of Member 
States, the promotion throughout the Community of a harmoni-
ous development of economic activities," a continuous and bal-
HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW (1973); MARGIE LINDSAY and STANLEY CROS-
SICK, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW (Belmont European Community Law Office, Brussels, 
1990); COMPENDIUM OF EC COMPANY LAW (1990). 
144. See Richard M. Buxbaum and Klaus J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the 
Business Enterprise, in 4 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 175, at 193 (1988). 
145. See infra text accompanying note 147. 
146. An English version is published in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW - BASIC Doc-
UMENTS (Philip Kunig et aI., eds., 1989). 
147. So far, in the field of company law, there is just one unified law setting up the 
framework for the "European Economic Interest Grouping"-EEIG, being an association 
of at least two individuals or firms from different EC Member States. See infra text 
accompanying note 173. 
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anced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising 
of the standard of living and closer relations between the Mem-
ber States. This article does not address company law directly; it 
only provides for a general program of the Community. Estab-
lishing a common market is one of the two intermediate objec-
tives which is expected to bring about the ultimate goals of the 
EC-Treaty. In 1986 the EC-Treaty was amended by the Single 
European Act,148 which provided for among other things the cre-
ation of an internal market no later than December 31, 1992.149 
Somewhat more concrete is Article 3 of the EC-Treaty, 
which states eleven specific activities of the Community which 
shall achieve the goals set forth in Article 2. Article 3(c) provides 
for the abolition, between Member States, of obstacles to free-
dom of movement of persons, services, and capital and Article 
3(h) approximates the extent of harmonization of the laws of 
Member States required for the proper functioning of the com-
mon market. 
The key provision of the EC-Treaty for the harmonization 
of the Member States' company laws is Article 54(3)(g), requir-
ing the Council and the Commission to carry out the duties dele-
gated to them under the preceding provisions (that is Title III of 
the said Treaty, Chapter 2 on the right of establishment) and in 
particular: 
"(g): by coordinating to the necessary extent the 
safeguards which, for the protection of the inter-
ests of members and others, are required by 
Member States of Companies or firms within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent 
throughout the community." 
The wording of this provision is somewhat unclear. It means 
that minority shareholders, creditors, employees etc. are to a 
148. European Single Act of February 17/28, 1986, O.J. EC 1987, No. L. 169, p. 1; 
For the impact of the Single European Act on the development of the EC, see Ernst 
Steindorff, Gemeinsamer Markt als Binnenmarkt, ZEITSCHRIFT PUR HANDELSRECHT 687 
(1986); Ehlermann, THE INTERNAL MARKET FOLLOWING THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, 24 
C.M.L. REV. 361 (1987); Pescatore, Die Einheitliche Europiiische Akte - Eine ernste 
Gefahr far den Europiiischen Markt, EuR 153 (1986). 
149. See Articles SA, SB, BC, 100A, 100B of the EC Treaty. 
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certain extent protected by each country's company legislation 
("safeguards"), and the community by coordinating these provi-
sions must be certain that a rather homogenius level of protec-
tion is reached.1II0 Article 58 concludes Chapter I of Title IIpcu 
by providing that companies or firms U12 formed in accordance 
with the law of a Member State and having their registered of-
fice, central administration or principal place of business within 
the Community shall, for the purpose of this chapter, be treated 
in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member 
States. 
Articles 100-102 of the EC-Treaty are the general provisions 
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States. IllS 
Article 100 sets forth that the Council shall, acting unani-
mously on a proposal from the Commission, issue directives for 
the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regula-
tion, or administrative action in Member States as directly affect 
the establishment or functioning of the common market.lII· As a 
consequence of the Single European Act,lllll Article 100A was 
amended to the Treaty, providing, that by way of derogation 
from Article 100 and, where otherwise provided in the Treaty, 
the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the 
objectives set out in Article 8A:11l6 
"The council shall, acting by a qualified major-
ityU7 on a proposal from the Commission in coop-
150. See Werlauff, supra note 143, at 208. 
151. Title III deals with the free movement of capital, Chapter 2 of this title with 
the right of establishment. 
152. According to Article 58(2) "companies or firms" means companies or firms con-
stituted under civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal 
persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are non profit-making. 
153. See Buxbaum and Hopt, supra note 144, at 205; W. SCHMEDER, DIE RECHTSAN-
GLEICHUNG ALS INTEGRATIONS MITTEL DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT (1978); HARMONI-
ZATION OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PRODUCT LIABILITY, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND 
CORPORATION LAW (P.E. Herzog ed., 1983). 
154. Article 100 provides for the consultation of the European Parliament and the 
Social Committee in the case of directives whose implementation would in one or several 
Member States, involve the amendment of legislation. 
155. See supra note 147. 
156. Article 8A defines the internal market as an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance 
with the provisions of the treaty and sets for that this internal market has to be estsb-
lished not later than by December 31, 1992. 
157. This is the key word. No unanimous voting is required. 
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eration with the European Parliament and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, 
adopt the measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or admin-
istrative action in Member States which have as 
their object the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market." 
[Vol. 1:91 
Of lesser practical importance in the field of company law is 
Article 220 of the EC-Treaty. Its third section concerns the mu-
tual recognition of companies in the broadest sense, the reten-
tion of legal personality on transfer of headquarters from one 
country to another, and the possibility of transnational merger 
of companies. Whereas Article 100 of the EC-Treaty provides for 
directives as the means of approximating the Member States' 
laws, Article 220 provides that the Member States should, when 
necessary, negotiate with each other to meet these requirements 
in favor of their nationals. 1118 
Article 235 of the EC-Treaty is the final basis for measures 
in the field of Company Law. If action by the Community 
should prove necessary in the course of the operation of the 
common market, and one of the objectives of the Community 
and the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the 
Council shall take the appropriate measures, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Eu-
ropean Parliament. This provision, concerning the demarcation 
between the competences of the Community and those of the 
Member States, is one of the most controversial provisions of 
the whole Treaty.lIi9 In the field of company law it has only been 
used Once for the regulation creating the European Economic In-
terest Grouping.180 
One more provision should be briefly mentioned, even 
though it does not particularly address issues of company law. 
Article 189 of the EC-Treaty provides for the juridical tools to 
attain the goals mentioned in the Treaty. Therefore, in order to 
carry out their task, the Council and the Commission shall, in 
accordance with the Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, 
158. See Buxbaum and Hopt, supra note 144, at 209. 
159. See Buxbaum and Hopt supra note 144, at 211. 
160. See infra note 174. 
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make decisions and recommendations or deliver opinions. In the 
field of company law the most important tool, so far, has been 
the directive. Article 189(3) of the EC-Treaty points out that the 
directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon 
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to 
the national authorities the choice of form and methods. A regu-
lation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its 
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.161 
C. EC-SECONDARY LEGISLATION162 
1. Directives 
To date, the Council has issued some 15 directives163 in the 
field of compnay law.164 The most important among them are 
the First Directive of March 9, 1968,165 the Second Directive of 
December 13, 1976/66 the Third Directive of October 9, 1978/67 
the Fourth Directive of July 25, 1978,168 the Sixth Directive of 
December 17, 1982,169 the Seventh Directive of June 13, 1983,170 
161. See Article 189(2) of the EC-Treaty. 
162. A short discription of all directives issued in the field of company and capital 
market law as of 1988 can be found in Buxbaum and Hopt, supra note 144, at 250 et seq. 
163. The counting system is somewhat confusing. Not all directives are numbered 
(in particular those directives are not numbered that amend former directives) and some 
numbers have been reserved for directives which are not yet in force (e.g. the Fifth, 
Ninth and Tenth Directive). 
164. A complete list of all directives and proposals in the field of company and capi-
tal market law as of August 1993 (including directives dealing with labor law, banking 
and insurrance law) can be found by Wiesner, supra note 2, at 500 et seq. 
165. Known as the "Publicity Directive", O.J. EC No. L 6% (March 14, 1968). It 
deals primarily with the uniformity of minimum disclosure provisions for company infor-
mation, both as provided in the commercial register and in th press. Moreover, it ad-
dresses issues like validity of commitments made by company organs, and nullity of im-
properly established companies. 
166. Known as the "Capital Directive", O. J. EC No. L 26 (January 30, 1977). It 
coordinates conditions of establishment of publicly held stock corporations and the 
maintenance of the company's minimum or statet capital. 
167. Known as the "Merger Directive", O.J. EC No. L 295/36 (October 20, 1978). It 
harmonizes the provisions of mergers of stock corporations which are subject to the same 
national laws and provides for a basis for the planned directive of international mergers. 
168. Known as the "Balance Sheets Directive", O.J. EC No. L 222/11 (August 14, 
1978). It harmonizes the provisions for accounting, balance sheets and the content and 
publication of the annual report of all kinds of limited liability companies. 
169. Known as the "Corporate Split-Up Directive", O.J. No. L 378/47 (December 
31, 1982). It deals with the splitting-up of stock corporations by way of takeovers and 
reincorporations. It is connected with the Third Directive (see supra note 167). 
170. Known as the "Groups of Companies Accounts Directive", O.J. No. L. 193 
(July 18, 1983). It is connected with the Fourth Directive (see supra note 168). It pro-
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the Eighth Directive of April 10, 1984,171 the Eleventh Directive 
of December 22, 1989,172 and the Twelfth Directive of December 
22, 1989.173 
2. Regulations 
So far only one regulation in the field of company law has 
been enacted by the Community, the Regulation on the Creation 
of the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) of July 25, 
1985.174 The regulation provides for a rather flexible legal form 
for international cooperations, either by firms or by individuals. 
It is important to note that the EEIG is not a company itself but 
rather an association of companies or individuals. 
The important regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings ("merger control regulation")17& lies in the 
borderline between antitrust and company law; therefore, 
strictly speaking, it is not a regulation on company law. 
D. PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
There are several proposals for directives to be enacted iiI 
the field of company law, some of them pending for many years. 
Besides the proposed Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers dis-
cussed below and other general bids,176 the most important 
propsals are the Amended Proposal of November 20, 1991 for a 
vides for a common framework for the annual reports of group of companies, notably 
transnational acting corporations. 
171. Known as the "Auditor Directive", O.J. EC No. L 126/20 (May 12, 1984). It 
harmonizes the provisions of admission and qualification of auditors. 
172. Known as the "Publicity of Branches Directive", O.J. EC No. L 395/36 (De-
cember 12, 1989). It coordinates the minimum disclosure provisions for branches of for-
eign companies. 
173. Known as the "Single Member Stock Corporation Directive", O.J. EC No. L 
395/40 (December 30, 1989). It provides for the possibility of a single member stock cor-
poration in all Member States. 
174. O.J. EC No. L 199 (July 31,1985) which entered into force on July 1, 1989. See 
MARGARET ANDERSON, CURRENT EC LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS: EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEREST 
GROUPINGS (1990). 
175. Council Regulation 4064/89, O.J. EC No. L 395. See Werlauff, supra note 143, 
at 224; Andreas Weitbrecht, Die Europliische Fusionskontrolluerordnung, EUROPAISCHE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTRECHT 18 (1990); Greenbaum, supra note 15. 
176. See infra text accompanying note 182. 
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Fifth Council Directive,!77 and the Proposal of January 8, 1985 
for a Tenth Directive.178 The Proposal for a Ninth Directive, the 
"Group of Companies Directive"179 is presently no longer 
discussed.180 
VI. PROPOSED TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE18l 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On February 2, 1989 the EC-Commission presented a Pro-
posal for a Thirteenth Directive on Company Law, concerning 
takeovers and other general bids182 which on May 10, 1990 was 
followed by an amended proposal for a Thirteenth Directive on 
Company Law, concerning takeovers and other general bids.18s 
177. Known as the Proposal for a "Structure Directive", O.J. EC No. C 321 (Decem-
ber 12, 1991). It deals with the structure of the corporation and the powers and obliga-
tions of its bodies. Because of the involved problem of labor co-determination, it is very 
unlikely that it will be enacted in the forseeable future. See also Buxbaum and Hopt, 
supra note 144, at 259-262. 
178. O.J. EC No. C 23/11 (January 14,1985). It deals with transnational mergers of 
stock corporations. This proposal is the second attempt of the Community to settle this 
issue, after the first one, a transnational agreement under Article 220 of the EC-Treaty, 
failed, see Buxbaum and Hopt, supra note 144, at 254. 
179. See LUTTER. EUROPAISCHES UNTERNEHMENSRECHT, supra note 2, at 57 et seq. 
180. See Buxbaum and Hopt, supra note 144, at 253; Wiesner, supra note 2. 
181. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 161; Assmann et al., Towards the Harmonization 
of EC-Member States Regulations on Takeover Bids: The Proposal for a Thirteenth 
Directive on Company Law, 9 Nw J. Int'l L. & Bus. 487 (1989); McLachlan and Mack-
esy, supra note 113; Dassesse, Selected Aspects of European Economic Community Law 
on Investments and Acquisitions in Europe, 25 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 375 (1991); Theo-
dor Baums, Ubernahmeregeln in der Europaischen Gemeinschaft, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1376 (1989); Klaus Peter Berger, Unternehmensilbernahmen in Eu-
ropa, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1644 (1991); Peter Hommelhoff and Dirk 
Kleindiek, Takeover-Richtlinie und Europaisches Konzernrecht, DIE AKTIENGESELL-
SCHAFT 106 (1990); K.G Lorit2 and K.R. Wagner, Das "ZwangsUbernahmeangebot" der 
EG-Takeover-Richtlinie aus verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht, WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN 
709 (1991); Hans Joachim Mertens, Forderung von, Schutz vor Zwang zu 
Ubernahmeangeboten, DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 252 (1990); Martina Rohrich, Gleichbe-
handlungspfiicht bei Kontrollacquisitionen: Eine Analyse der 13. EG-Richtlinie aus 
okonomischer Sicht, RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 93 (1993); Jutta Stoll, 
Zum Vorschlag der EG-Kommission fUr die 13. Richtlinie auf dem Gebiet des Gesell-
schaftsrechts Uber Ubernahmeangebote, BETRIEBs-BERATER 1489 (1989); Peter Salje, 
"Feindliche Ubernahmen" -Gegenstrategien und Regulierungh im zukUnftigen 
europaischen Binnenmarkt, JURISTISCHE ARBEITsBLATTER 321 (1990). 
182. O.J. No. C 64/8 (March 14, 1989). Oppinion of the European Parliament: O.J. 
No. C 38/41 (February 19, 1990); Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee: O.J. 
No. C 298/56 (November 27, 1989). 
183. O.J. EC No. C 240/7 (September 26, 1990); Additional Opinion of the Economic 
and Social Committee: O.J. EC No. C 102/49 (April 18, 1991) [hereinafter "the 
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Currently the Proposal, which was clearly inspired by the Brit-
ish City Code on Mergers and Takeovers,184 is once again being 
reviewed by the Commission in light of the Principle of Sub-
sidiarityl8~ which was amended to the EC-Treaty in 1992.188 The 
Commission considers such a Directive necessary to protect the 
interests of the holders of the securities of companies governed 
by the law of a Member State, when the securities of these com-
panies, which are admitted to trading on a regular market, are 
the subject of a takeover or other general bid.187 The Directive is 
designed to ensure that 
- all holders of securities of an offeree company 
who are in the same position are treated equally, 
- the addressees of a bid have sufficient time and 
information to enable them to reach a properly 
informed decision on the bid, 
- the board of an offeree company acts in the in-
terests of all the shareholders and cannot frus-
trate the bid, 
- false markets are not created in the securities of 
the offeree company, of the offeror company, or of 
any other company concerned by the bid, and 
- offeree companies are not hindered in the con-
duct of their affairs beyond a reasonable time by 
an offer for their securities.188 
B. BASICS OF THE PROPOSAL 
Article 1 defines the scope of application of the directive. 
For example, in Germany, it applies to the "Aktiengesellschaft 
(AG)"189 and the "Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien 
(KGaA),"I90 in the United Kingdom to the public company, lim-
ited by shares, in Italy to the "societa per azioni" and to the 
Proposal "]. 
184. See Morse, supra note 5; Wouters, supra note 6, at 280. 
185. For the meaning of this principle see Deborah Z. Cass, The word that saves 
Maastricht? The principle of subsidiarity and the division of powers within the Euro-
pean Community, 29 COMMON MARKET L. R. 1107 (1992); A. G. Toth, The principle of 
subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 29 COMMON MARKET L. R. 1079 (1992). 
186. See Article 3(b) of the Treaty. 
187. See Amended Proposal, supra note 183, at 7, 6th recital. 
188. See Amended Proposal, supra note 183, at 8, 9th recital. 
189. Stock Corporation, see supra text accompanying note 43. 
190. Commercial Partnership limited by shares. 
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"societa in accomandita per azioni",191 in France to the "societe 
anonyme" and the "societe en commandite par actions."192 
Article 2 defines technical terms. "Takeover or other gen-
eral bid" is defined as "an offer made to the holders of the se-
curities of a company to acquire all or part of these securities by 
payment in cash or in exchange for other securities." "Parties to 
the bid" are defined as "the offeror, the representative of the 
offeror within the meaning of Article 9,193 the directors of the 
offeror, if the latter is a company, or the addressees of the bid 
and the directors of the offeree company." "Persons acting in 
concert" means "persons who, through concerted practices or 
pursuant to an agreement, cooperate with one another in con-
nection with a bid." 
Article 4 contains the most controversial prOVlSlon of the 
whole proposal.194 It provides that any person ("the acquirer") 
who as a result of acqusition by himself or by a person referred 
to in paragraph 2195 holds securities which, added to any existing 
holdings, give him a percentage of the voting rights in a com-
pany (which may not be fixed at more than one-third of the vot-
ing rights existing at the date of acquisition) shall be obligated 
to make a bid to acquire all the securities of the company. 
Article 6 prouides for the installation of a supervisory au-
thority which must discharge the functions specified in the di-
rective. The authorities thus designated are allowed to delegate 
all or part of their powers to other authorities or to associations 
or private bodies. Moreover, the powers and tasks of the super-
visory authorities are described in detail.196 
Article 6(a) states the main functions of this supervisory au-
thority. The agency must ensure the above-mentioned goals of 
191. Stock corporation and commercial partnership limited by shares. 
192. Stock corporation and commercial partnership limited by shares. 
193. Article 9 defines the representatives of the offeror. 
194. For a critical review see Wouters, supra note 6, at 279; LUTIER, EUROPAISCHES 
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT, supra note 2, at 642' et seq. 
195. Paragraph 2 states how to calculate the threshold referred to in pragrah 1. It 
provides for, in part, that voting rights have to be added that are held by other persons 
or entities in their own names but on behalf off the acquirer or those voting rights held 
by undertakings controlled by the acquirer or voting rights held by any other person 
acting in concert with the acquirer. 
196. For further details see Wouters, supra note 6, at 307 et seq. 
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the directive.197 
Article 7 deals with the procedure prior to publication of the 
offer. As soon as the offeror has decided to make a bid, he shall 
inform the competent supervisory authority and the board of 
the offeree company and then make his decision public as de-
scribed in detail in Article 11. Moreover, Article 7 provides that 
the offeror shall immediately create an offer document in accor-
dance with Article 10 and make such document public. Before 
its publication, the offeror shall communicate the document to 
the supervisory authority and to the board of the offeree 
company. 
Article 8, also a highly controversial provision,198 provides for 
certain restrictions on the powers of the board of the offeree 
company. After receiving the information referred to in Article 7 
and until the result of the bid is made public, the board of the 
offeree company shall not, without obtaining the authorization 
of the general meeting of shareholders within the period of ac-
ceptance, decide: 
- to issue securities, 
- to engage in transactions which would have the 
effect of altering significantly the assets or liabili-
ties of the company or resulting in the company 
entering into commitments without consideration, 
unless the supervisory authority authorizes with 
reasons such transactions, or 
- to have the company acquire its own shares. 
Additionally, Article 8 provides that the board of the offeree 
company may call a general meeting of shareholders before the 
expiration of the period of acceptance. 
Article 9 deals with the representative of the offeror and 
states that such offeror shall be represented either by a qualified 
person authorized to deal on the Community financial markets 
or by a credit institution authorized within the community. 
Article 10 prescribes quite extensively the content of the offer 
document, which must disclose all the information necessary to 
enable the addressees to reach a properly informed decision on 
197. See supra text after note 186. 
198. For a critical review see Wouters, supra note 6, at 285 et seq and 291 et seq. 
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the bid.199 
Article 11 states the forms of disclosure of the bid, for example 
mass-circulation newspapers or national gazettes. 
Article 12 deals with the period of acceptance. Member States 
shall provide that the period of acceptance of the bid may not be 
less than four weeks or more than ten weeks from the date on 
which the document is made public. According to paragraph 2 
the period may not be modified without the authorization of the 
supervisory authority. 
Article 13 specifies six circumstances under which a bid may be 
withdrawn or is void, for example when a competing bid by an-
other offeror is made or in the case of a bid where new securities 
are offered in exchange for the original securities, and the ap-
proval of the general meeting of the offeror company is not ob-
tained for the issue of new securities. 
Article 14 states the obligation of the board of the offeree com-
pany to draw up an opinion on the bid. In this document, which 
must be made public well before the expiration of the period of 
acceptance,200 the board must express its opinion on the bid and 
any of its revisions together with the reasons on which it is 
based. This document must specify at a minimum whether the 
board of the offeree company is in agreement with the offeror on 
the bid, any agreements on the exercise of the voting rights at-
tached to the securities of the offeree company, so far as the 
board is aware of them, and whether the board members of the 
offeree company, who hold securities themselves, intend to ac-
cept the bid. 
Article 15 deals with the revision of bids and provides that 
at any time before the last week of the period of acceptance the 
offereor may revise the terms of the bid. The Member States 
may take appropriate steps to ensure that any successive revi-
sions of the bid do not improperly impede the operation of the 
offeree company and of the market.201 
199. Besides name, type registered office of both the offeree and the offeror com-
pany the document must specify the persons responsible for the offer document, the 
securities for which the bid is made, the securities already held by the offeror or other 
persons acting on behalf of the offeror or held by undertakings controlled by the offeror 
or held by persons acting in concert with the offeror. Moreover detailled information 
about the attached voting rights and about options to acquire securities must be given, 
and much more. In total, about 20 different different details of information are required. 
200. See Article 14(3) of the Proposal. 
201. See Article 15(2a) of the Proposal. 
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Article 16 provides for an "automatic revision." After the public 
announcement but until the end of the period of acceptance, if 
the offeror, other persons, or entities acting in their own name 
but on behalf of the offeror or in concert with the offeror ac-
quires securities which are the subject of the bid on more 
favorable conditions than those in the offer document, or any 
revisions thereof, the Member States shall ensure that the ad-
dressees of the bid qualify for the more favorable conditions. 
Article 17 deals with the information of the supervisory 
authorithy and provides for the obligation of all parties to the 
bid202 to give detailed information concerning the bidding pro-
cess to the supervisory authority. 
Article 18 provides that on the expiration of the period of ac-
ceptance, the results of the bid shall be made public 
immediately. 
Article 19 deals with the information for representatives of em-
ployees of the offeree company. The board of the offeree com-
pany shall communicate to its employees' representatives the of-
fer document and other specified information. According to 
Article 19(2), such documents or information shall be communi-
cated immediately after they are made public. 
Article 20 provides that basically the same procedure as de-
scribed in the foregoing articles applies to all competing bids. 
Article 21 provides for the creation of a contact committee 
under the auspices of the Commission. It shall have the function 
of facilitating the uniform application of the Directive through 
regular consultations on, in particular, practical problems arising 
in its implementaton and ensuring concerted action in the poli-
cies followed by the Member States in order to obtain reciprocal 
treatment for Community nationals and companies in regard to 
the acquisition of securities of a company by means of a take-
over bid. Finally, the contact committee shall advise the Com-
mission, if necessary, on additions or amendments to the 
Directive. 
Article 22 provides for the adoption of the Directive into na-
tional legislation. 
202. As defined in the fifth indent of Article 2. 
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VII. WILLIAMS ACT, PROPOSAL AND GERMAN LAW 
A. PROPOSAL COMPARED TO THE WILLIAMS ACT203 
The Williams Act, as pointed out above, governs the tender 
offer process in the United States.204 It takes quite a different 
approach than the Proposal by focusing mainly on the flow of 
information between the offeror,2011 the target's management, 
and investors rather than on substantive rights of the offeror or 
the management.206 The Williams Act only requires the offeror 
to disclose all the important information of the bid, i.e. the 
terms and conditions of the bid, to the investors207 without giv-
ing advantage to either party of the bid.208 In the United States, 
the federal law209 creates a level playing field to the benefit of 
the shareholders. The Proposal goes far beyond that and tries to 
regulate the whole bidding process by ensuring equal treatment 
of all the shareholders. Both of the essentials of the Proposal, 
provided for in Article 4210 and Article 8,211 the obligation of the 
offeror, once he has acquired more than one-third of the targetss 
shares, to also bid for the remaining securities of the target com-
pany, and respectively, the prohibition of certain defensive tac-
tics of the target's management during the time the bid is pend-
ing, have no counterparts in the Williams Act. In summary, 
Greenbaum is perfectly right, when he concludes: "The Propo-
sal's more substantive regulation shrinks the playing field be-
tween the hostile bidder and incumbent management. The Pro-
posal operates to deter a number of tender offers, but at the 
same time restricts the actions that target management may 
take while a hostile tender offer is pending. The shrinking of the 
playing field, moreover, occurs at all stages of the tender offer 
203. See Gree.nbaum, supra note 1; Gilson, supra note 1; Stith, supra note 1; 
Greene, supra note 1; Wouters, supra note 6. 
204. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m,(d),(e), 78n(d) - (g) (1988). It also regulates the acquisition of 
significant equity positions by shareholders. The following overview focuses on the provi-
sions for tender offers only. 
205. Referred to as "bidder" in the Williams Act. 
206. See Greenbaum, supra note 1, at 927; Wouters, supra note 6, at 279. 
207. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988). 
208. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) the Supreme Court stated, that 
Congress took care in structuring the Williams Act to "avoid tipping the scales either in 
favor of the management or in favour of the person making the takeover bids". 
209. As far as the state anti-takeover legislation is concerned, see supra footnote 32. 
210. See supra text accompanying note 194. 
211. See supra text accompanying note 198. 
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process. The smaller field, however, may be tilted in favor of the 
hostile bidder. Although the bidder has less room to maneuver 
and may have difficulty entering the game because of the regula-
tory obstacles, the target, without the ability to adopt extraordi-
nary defensive tacticts, may be chained to the goal post."212 
B. IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSAL ON GERMAN COMPANY LAW 
1. Structural Obstacles for Hostile Tender Offers in Germany 
The foregoing has shown, that, as far as the present legal 
situation in Germany is concerned, the bidding process is gov-
erned only by voluntary guidelines, issued by the stock ex-
change's commission of experts. These guidelines, which can not 
be legally enforced, do not really bar hostile tender offers. How-
ever, no US-style hostile tender offers have taken place so far.us 
The reasons for this are structural rather than plain legal cir-
cumstances, some of which have already been addressed earlier. 
They can be summarized as follows: 
From the country's approximately 2400 stock corporations, 
only about 500 are publicly traded,214 and maybe about a third 
of them are well protected by a large minority or even a majority 
stockholder, usually a bank, insurance company or an old family 
trust.m Therefore, the takeover market is comparatively 
smal}.216 The two-tier board system,217 the principle of labor co-
determinationu8 with half or one third of the supervisory board 
being labor representatives and the three-fourths majority re-
quirement for all major changes in the structure of the corpora-
tion make it not impossible, but at least somewhat complicated 
and time-consuming to create a change in corporate control. As 
pointed out above, German corporations in general are not al-
212. See Greenbaum, supra note I, at 929-930. 
213. See supra note 22. 
214. As of the end of 1988. At the same time, approximately 350,000 privately held 
stock corporations were registered, see Wouters, supra note 6, at 269 note 3. 
215. See Why Germany dislikes Hostile Takeovers, BUSINESS LAW BRIEF 17 (August 
1988). 
216. Community-wide, only 54% of the top 400 corporations are listed, compared to 
99% in the USA, see Wouters, supra note 6, at 269. 
217. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
218. See supra note 57. 
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lowed to deal in their own stock. 219 This leads to a total absence 
of "greenmailing" activity. Whoever tries to takeover a company 
must fight to the bitter end and cannot leave the battlefield be-
forehand with a sweet "goodbye-kiss" of the company. Every 
fundamental change in the structure of a German stock corpora-
tion which brings with it a sale of assets or a dismissal of em-
ployees creates very high costs for the company: The sale of as-
sets means tax-wise realization of hidden reserves,220 and the 
dismissal of employees is not possible without reimbursing them 
for their lost jobs.221 Today in Germany these are the major part 
of costs for any corporate restructural measure, notwithstanding 
what event the restruction has caused.222 
Moreover, there is another factual obstacle that contributes 
much to the lack of US-style takeover activity. As pointed out 
earlier, the supervisory board is the first bastion that must be 
taken by a would-be conqueror on the way to corporate control. 
One might ask why it is not possible to take it and dismiss the 
old management, at least in those cases, where the chairman of 
the supervisory board is a shareholders' representative having 
the casting vote in case of a tie.223 It probably would cause an 
uproar and - if one of the major German corporations in the 
banking, car manufacturing, chemistry or electronic branch were 
the target - very likely a strike within this whole particular 
branch of industry, if the prerogative were used in that way. 
Moreover, in Germany from the beginning the members of the 
supervisory board of the huge corporations have been reputable 
business and banking personalities from other corporations with 
major influence as main suppliers, main customer or house 
banks for this particular corporation.224 To fire them like a char-
219. See sec. 71 ff of the Stock Corporation Act. From this general rule, only a few 
exceptions exist, see supra text accompanying note 134. 
220. Being the difference between the fair market value of a corporate asset and its 
value on the books. The German system of tax accounting allows to a much greater ex-
tent than the American one an accumulation of such hidden reserves which are to be 
taxed in case they are sold, because under sec. 16, 34 of the German income tax code 
there is hardly any possibilities of a carry over. 
221. Referred to as "Sozialplan" in German language. 
222. See GUnter Heckelmann, LABOR CONTRACTS, and Rainer Stachels and Markus 
Kappenhagen, Works constitution, both in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY, supra 
note 57. 
223. All industrial corporations with more than 2000 employees, besides coal mining 
and steel industry. 
224. By way of example, the Chief Executive Officer of Deutsche Bank, by far the 
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woman after a takeover of the stock majority would be an af-
front against the "old boys" of the established business society 
in Germany as a whole,221i and would probably cause insur-
mountable difficulties to find successors for them with any repu-
tation within the country's business and banking society. And 
even if they were replaced, their above-mentioned influence as 
customer, supplier or house bank would remain. 
2. Will The Proposal Bring About A Change In Germany? 
According to the "Bangemann memorandum",226 the EC-
Commission with its proposal for a takeover directive aims to 
encourage takeovers within the common market. The question 
this article examined was whether the Thirteenth EC-Directive 
on Company Law, concerning takeovers and other general bids, 
will bring on a change and lead eventually to US-style hostile 
tender offers and takeover fights in Germany. The answer is 
"probably not." The obstacles responsible for the lack of a US-
style takeover activity in Germany are of a more factual rather 
than legal in nature, and they are not going to disappear with an 
implementation of the Directive, once entered into force. There-
fore, it is hard to imagine that United States hostile takeover 
activity will be found in Germany in the near future. However 
this does not mean that the number of US-style hostile tender 
offers will remain absolutely zero. 
C. FINAL REMARKS 
Whether this is good or bad depends on whether unnego-
tiated takeovers are considered positive or negative for the econ-
omy as a whole. Examining this question is, if possible at all, 
well beyond the scope of this article227 and would lead to the 
shaky grounds of economic theories on the law of the market. 
From an American point of view, being an investor that regards 
business corporations primarily as profit-generators, a continous 
largest German banking corporation, is the chairman of the supervisory board of 
Daimler-Benz. 
225. See Peltzer, supra note 121, at 282. 
226. See supra note 21. 
227. For a comparative overview of this discussion see Wouters, supra note 6, at 274 
et seq. 
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lack of a German "market for corporate control"228 is probably 
regrettable.229 From a Continental-European standpoint, viewing 
business associations "institutionally," as autonomous and en-
during groups of human beings in which shareholders' interests 
must be balanced against those of other interested parties, like 
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers or the local region or 
state,230 the likely ongoing absence of US-style hostile takeover 
activity in Germany probably is highly welcomed.231 
228. See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110 (1965). 
229. The advantages for investors of a hostile takeover are obvious: the price per 
share in a hostile tender offer always contains a significant premium over the market 
price and in addition to that very often the initial offer is once again increased either by 
the offeror himself during the takeover battle or other, higher offers are made during the 
process of auctioning. And several examples from the US-takeovers show, that the man-
agement change lead to an increase of value of corporate assets. See Holderness and 
Sheehan, Why corporate raiders are good news for stockholders, in THE REVOLUTION OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 414 (1989). However, it could be argued, that if it is really the 
change in management that leads to an increase of value of corporate assets then there 
are other possibilities of bringing on such a change without the disadvantages of a ruin-
ous takeover fight, for example a proxy contest, see Randall S. Thomas, supra note I, at 
503. 
230. See Wouters, supra note 6, at 274. 
231. The main concerns are against highly leveraged transactions, which were char-
acteristic for the US-deals in the 1980s. If the takeover is successful, the company is over 
its head in debt. The financial scope to meet challenges of the future, either caused by 
the need of environmental protection or by a highly competitive industry in the Far East 
not struggeling with takeover debts, is not available. If the company is going bankrupt or 
has to be reorganized after a ruinous takeover battle, than the price is not only paid by 
shareholders, but also by the employees loosing their jobs. And, so could be argued, even 
if a company will never become a target, the mere possibility of an eventual takeover has 
negative consequences; building financial reserves in good years for worse ones is not 
possible, because this would make the company an attractive target. Very costly long 
term investments for basic research in the field of high tech or chemical industry which 
temporarily may lead to fewer earnings, but which are indispensable to assure the exis-
tence of the corporation among international competitors in the future are not possible, 
because even a temporary revenue decrease leads to a lower stock price and makes a 
takeover cheaper and so more likely. When the number of corporations and the amounts 
of money involved in deals during the 1980s steadily increased, one of the "gurus" of 
American corporate directors, Lee Iacocca, took a critical standpoint in saying that for-
eign corporations have all the time they need to strengthen their position on the Ameri-
can market while US companies are fully busy with their takeover fights, see Interview, 
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 13 (Feb. 3, 1987). 
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